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Chandler v. Lee
89 Fed. Appx. 830 (4th Cir. 2004)
I. Facts
A North Carolina jury found Frank Ray Chandler guilty of the first-degree
murder of Doris Poore, and the trial judge sentenced Chandler to death.'
Circumstantial evidence provided the primary basis for Chandler's conviction.
2
The evidence linking Chandler to the crime included Chandler's paImprints and
fingerprints on Poore's kitchen door, testimony from Chandler's cousin that
Chandler had tried to fabricate an alibi on the night of the murder, and the
testimony of Jeffrey Kyle Wilson that Chandler had described the killing to him
while they were celimates in prison.3 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
affirmed the sentence and convictions on direct appeal.4 A state trial court
denied Chandler's motion for appropriate relief ("MAR"), and the Supreme
Court of North Carolina denied Chandler's petition for a writ of certiorari.' In
August 1999 Chandler filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.6 The district
court denied Chandler's habeas petitions, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability ("COA") to review
four issues that the district court denied.7
1. Chandler v. Lee, 89 Fed. Appx. 830, 833 (4th Cir. 2004) (opinion not selected for
publication); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (2003) (instructing the jury to make sentencing
recommendation to the trial judge, who then imposes a sentence of death only if the jury's recom-
mendation is unanimous). The United States Supreme Court denied Chandler's petition for a writ
of certiorari. Chandler v. Polk, No. 04-5904, 2004 WL 2202438, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2004).
2. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 833.
3. Id.
4. Id; see State v. Chandler, 467 S.E.2d 636, 649 (N.C. 1996) (affirming conviction and
sentence); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(1) (2003) (requiring automatic review by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina of all death sentences).
5. Chandler v. French, 252 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226 (M.D.N.C. 2003); see N.C. GEN. STAT.
15A-141 1(a) (2003) ("Relief from errors committed in the trial division, or other post-trial relief,
may be sought by a motion for appropriate relief."). Chandler alleged "that (1) the prosecution had
knowingly allowed Wilson to testify falsely, (2) the prosecution failed to disclose evidence that
would have impeached Wilson's testimony, and (3) one of his attorneys had previously represented
Wilson, and thus was laboring under a conflict of interest in violation of Chandler's Sixth Amend-
ment rights." Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 833.
6. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 834.
7. Id; see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2004) ("Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order
in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1
I. Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Chandler's habeas
petition.' Reviewing the state court's rulings under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), the court held that the state courts did not err in finding that the
prosecution did not violate Napue v. Illinois? by knowingly using false testimony,
the prosecution did not violate Brady v. Mayland by withholding various pieces
of evidence, Chandler's attorney did not have an actual conflict of interest by
previously representing the prosecution's star witness, and the trial court was not
required to give the jury an "extreme emotional disturbance" instruction during
sentencing." Thus, the court found that the state court's legal determinations
were not "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" federal law and that
the state court's factual determinations were not unreasonable in light of the facts
presented to the state court.
III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the state court's decision under 28 U.S.C.
2254(d) (1) because the North Carolina state courts adjudicated Chandler's claims
on the merits and Chandler exhausted his remedies in the state courts. 3 Pursu-
ant to § 2254(d)(1), courts may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if a state
by a State court."; part of AEDPA); see also 4TH CIR. R. 22(a) (stating the Fourth Circuit's proce-
dures for requesting a COA). See general4 Maxwell C. Smith, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 635 (2004)
(analyzing 4TH CIR. R. 22(a)).
8. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 834, 842.
9. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 836-42; see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959) (holding
that the State deprives a defendant of due process when the prosecutor knowingly obtains a
conviction through the use of false evidence or allows false evidence to go uncorrected when it
appears at trial); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963) (holding that the State violates a
defendant's due process rights when it suppresses exculpatory evidence, and the evidence is material
to the outcome of the trial).
12. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 832-42; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (discussing the
standard of review for federal courts reviewing a habeas corpus petition on issues of law that the
state courts adjudicated on the merits; part of AEDPA); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (discussing the
standard of review for federal courts reviewing a habeas corpus petition on factual issues that the
state courts adjudicated on the merits; part of AEDPA).
13. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 834; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c), (d)(1) (making § 2254(d)(1) the
standard of review when the state court adjudicated an issue of law on the merits and the defendant
exhausted all state remedies; part of AEDPA). Tl7he Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed
Chandler's conviction on direct appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied a writ of
certiorari. Chandler, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 225-26. The trial court's denial of Chandler's MAR and the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's denial of Chandler's writ of certiorari left Chandler with no
available remedies in the state court system. Id.
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court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States."' 4 Interpreting § 2254(d) (1), the United States Supreme Court in
Williams v. Taylor s stated that a "decision is 'contrary to' Supreme Court prece-
dent.., when 'the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law
set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,' " or a" 'state court confronts a set of facts
that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and
nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.' ,16
Additionally, Wi/l'ams held that a state court decision is an "unreasonable applica-
tion" of Supreme Court precedent when" 'the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.' ,,1
B. Napue Claim
Chandler first claimed that the prosecution knowingly allowed Wilson, the
jailhouse snitch, to testify falsely that he did not ask the prosecution for lenience
on his pending charges in exchange for information regarding Chandler." In
analyzing Chandler's claim, the Fourth Circuit cited Napue, which held that the
State deprives a defendant of due process when the prosecutor knowingly
obtains a conviction through the use of false evidence or allows false evidence
to go uncorrected when it appears at trial.'9 The court noted that, in order to
warrant a new trial, the false testimony must be material, meaning that there must
exist " 'a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony' " affected the jury's
determination.2 °
Chandler claimed that various pieces of evidence that the prosecution
withheld proved that Wilson testified falsely at trial?.' The withheld evidence
included Special Agent Perry's testimony on Wilson's behalf at Wilson's parole
revocation hearing, Wilson's statement asking what was in it for him in initial
interviews with investigators, and initial police reports listing Wilson's pending
charges.2' The MAR court denied Chandler's claims, ruling that there was no
agreement between Wilson and the State to exchange leniency for Wilson's
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
15. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
16. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 834 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,405-06 (2000)).
17. Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).
18. Id At trial, when questioned whether he asked for leniency in exchange for his testimony,
Wilson said, "I ain't asked these people [the prosecution] for personal gain whatsoever. I never
brung [up] my charges ... in any of our conversations." Id
19. Id. at 835 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269).
20. Id. (quoting Kyles v. Whidey, 514 U.S. 419, 433 n.7 (1995)).
21. Id
22. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 835.
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testimony.23 In federal habeas proceedings, Chandler contended that the exis-
tence of an agreement was not the issue and that the real issue was whether
Wilson testified falsely in saying that he never brought up his charges during
negotiations.24 Chandler argued that he did and that the prosecution violated
Napue by allowing Wilson to testify falsely about not bringing up his charges.25
The Fourth Circuit cited the MAR court's finding that Wilson did not
initiate a discussion regarding his pending charges with the investigators or the
prosecution. 26 The court concluded that Wilson testified truthfully in denying
that he ever brought up his charges during negotiations because he never actually
initiated discussions about those charges.2'7 Thus, the court held that the state
court's factual determinations were not erroneous under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
or § 2254(e)(1). 2' Further, the court did not discuss the interplay of§ 2254(d)(2)
and § 2254(e)(1) because the MAR court's decision did not violate either
section.29
C. Brady Claim
Chandler claimed that the prosecution committed six Brady violations.3"
The Fourth Circuit stated that Brady held that the State violates a defendant's due
process rights when it suppresses evidence that is favorable to the defense and
the evidence is material to the outcome of the trial." The court noted that
evidence favorable to the defense includes evidence relating to the credibility of
witnesses.32 The court added that materiality depends on whether there is a
23. Id
24. Id at 835-36.
25. Id at 834.
26. Id. at 836.
27. Id.
28. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 836 n.5; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2000) (prohibiting a federal
court from granting habeas corpus petition unless the state court's factual determination is "an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding"; part of AEDPA); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000) (instructing a federal court to presume
a state court's factual determination correct unless the defendant rebuts that "presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence"; part of AEDPA).
29. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 836 n.5.
30. Id at 837-39. The defense discovered the Brady evidence after examining law enforce-
ment filings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(0, which gives the defendant access to all law
enforcement filings during postconviction proceedings. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13,
Chandler v. Polk, 2004 WL 2202438 (U.S. Oct. 4,2004) (No. 04-5904) (available with author upon
request) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415() (2003)). The trial prosecutors did not daim to have
an open file policy; they only claimed to disclose evidence that they needed to reveal under the law.
Id at 12.
31. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 836 (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
32. Id (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972)).
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reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence, taken as a whole, would
have affected the outcome of the trial had the prosecution disclosed the evi-
dence.33 Further, Chandler raised issues that the MAR court did not address, and
the court reviewed those issues de novo.
34
1. 'What's in it for me?"
The first alleged Brady violation was the prosecution's failure to disclose that
Wilson had asked what was in it for him in his initial interview with an investigat-
ing officer.3 5 Although the court recognized that the evidence had some exculpa-
tory value concerning Wilson's motives for testifying, the court found that the
evidence was not material because there had been no deal between the prosecu-
tion and Wilson and because Chandler's attorney thoroughly cross-examined
Wilson.36 Thus, the Fourth Circuit did not grant a new trial because the evidence
was not reasonably likely to affect the outcome of the trial.3"
2. Police Reports
Chandler next claimed that Brady required the prosecution to turn over
police reports made after initial interviews with Wilson which included state-
ments indicating that Wilson brought up his charges with investigators.3" Chan-
dler claimed that the reports undermine Wilson's testimony that he did not bring
up his pending charges with the prosecution.39 The Fourth Circuit adopted the
MAR court's determination that Wilson only mentioned the charges listed on the
police report in response to a question by the investigating officer.' Thus, the
evidence showed that Wilson testified truthfully when he stated that he never
brought up his charges with the prosecution, and the evidence was not favorable
to the defense in terms of Brady.
33. Id. (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34, 436).
34. Id. at 836 n.6; see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 692 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that, in
a federal habeas action, courts should conduct de novo review of claims raised in state courts but
not adjudicated on the merits).
35. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 837. The Fourth Circuit ruled on this issue de novo because
Chandler raised this issue with the MAR court but the court did not make a ruling. Id. at 837 n.7.
36. Id at 837.
37. Id; see Kes, 514 U.S. at 433-34 (defining evidence as material if there is a reasonable
probability that it would have affected the outcome of the trial had it been disclosed to the defense).
38. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 837.
39. Id
40. Id. The MAR court made this finding after the investigating officer, Perry, testified that




3. Attendance at Parole Revocation Hearing
Additionally, Chandler asserted that the prosecution failed to turn over a
report, which stated that Perry and the Sheriff of Surry County, the county where
Wilson's charges were pending, attended Wilson's parole revocation hearing and
that Perry testified at the revocation hearing.4 2 Chandler claimed that the report
was favorable to his case because it showed that Wilson expected something
from the State in exchange for testifying.43 The court found that the report was
not material because the jurors knew of Perry's testimony at the parole hearing
when they made their decision.' Additionally, the court found that the Sheriff's
presence at the trial was not material because there was nothing unusual about
a Sheriff's presence at a parole revocation hearing in his own jail. 4's
4. Reward Money
Next, Chandler claimed that due process required the prosecution to turn
over a proclamation by the State announcing a $5,000 monetary award for
information about Poore's murder.' Chandler argued that the State had to turn
over the proclamation because it suggested Wilson's motivations for fabricating
his testimony.47 The court noted, however, that the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Keley4s held that the prosecution did not need to turn over evidence that
the defense could obtain through reasonable diligence.49 The court rejected
Chandler's claim because the proclamation was made public and defense counsel
had access to it.'
5. Sentence in Police Report
A police report made after Wilson's initial interview with an investigating
officer disclosed that Wilson stated, "Chandler never said that he touched or
fondled [Poore] in any way."'" The MAR court found that this statement
42. Id at 837-38. The Fourth Circuit ruled on the issues de novo because the MAR court
did not adjudicate the claim on the merits. Id at 838 n.8.
43. Id at 837-38.
44. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 838. Specifically, Perry testified at trial that he was present and
testified at Wilson's parole revocation hearing. Id at 837. Also, Wilson testified at trial that he
requestcd Perry to appear at the hearing in hopes that Perry's appearance would help his case for
parole. Id.
45. Id at 838.
46. Id Wilson received half of the reward money following Chandler's conviction. Id
47. Id at 838.
48. 35 F.3d 929 (4th Cir. 1994).






indicated that Chandler never mentioned to Wilson whether he did or did not
touch or fondle Poore. 2 The MAR court did not consider the statement favor-
able to Chandler and held that withholding the statement did not violate Bradyi3
The Fourth Circuit gave deference to the MAR court's factual determination
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and found that the State did not violate Chandler's
due process rights by not disclosing the statement.5
4
6. Lab Report
Chandler's final Brady contention involved the prosecution's failure to
disclose a lab report comparing Wilson's handwriting with handwriting in a letter
allegedly written by Wilson."5 The letter noted that Wilson "never [spoke] to a
district attorney or the court concerning Chandler, that Wilson would not testify
at [Chandler's] trial," and that Wilson would lie concerning his pending charges.
s6
Chandler claimed that the report was favorable to the defense because it would
have prompted him to obtain further analysis potentially linking Wilson to the
letter.5" The Fourth Circuit rejected Chandler's Brady claim and stated that, in
order to obtain relief, Chandler had to show that the additional analysis would
have established Wilson as the letter's author.5" Further, in dicta, the court
questioned whether the North Carolina Rules of Evidence allowed the introduc-
tion of handwriting analysis to impeach witness testimony.
5 9
D. Defense Attorny s Conflict of Interest
Chandler's next claim alleged that his trial attorney's prior representation of
Wilson violated Chandler's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.' James
Gillespie, one of Chandler's attorneys, had a potential conflict of interest because
he previously represented Wilson on forgery charges to which Wilson eventually
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 838-39.
55. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 839. Both the prosecution and the defense had copies of the




59. Id; see N.C. R. EviD. 608(b) (prohibiting the use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific
instances of conduct to attack a witness's credibility); see also Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) (prohibiting the
use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of conduct to attack a witness's credibility);
United States v. Westmoreland, 312 F.3d 302,311 n.5 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that Federal Rule of
Evidence 608(b) does not allow expert testimony regarding handwriting in a letter to corroborate
a witness's testimony).
60. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 840; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
2004]
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pled guilty.6 During jury selection, Gillespie notified his co-counsel and Chan-
dler of the conflict.6 2 Gillespie did not believe it was a conflict of interest and did
not inform the court or have Chandler execute a waiver.63 The MAR court held
that the conflict did not violate Chandler's Sixth Amendment right because,
although a potential conflict existed, an actual conflict never developed.'
In order for a conflict of interest to violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, the court stated, a defendant who did not object to the conflict
at trial must show that " 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance.' "65 The court noted that" 'a mere theoretical division of
loyalties' is insufficient."'  Although a court presumes prejudice when a defen-
dant proves a conflict of interest, the court noted that the United States Supreme
Court has not ruled decisively on whether a presumption of prejudice arises in
a case of successive representation.67 The court identified four factors that are
relevant, but not necessary, in determining whether successive representation
results in an actual conflict of interest.68 The factors were as follows: (1) if there
is a substantial relationship between the current and former cases; (2) whether the
former client disclosed confidential information to the attorney; (3) the time
between the successive representations, particularly if the first representation
ceased by the time the second representation started; and (4) whether the attor-
ney has a monetary interest in representing the previous client in the future.69
In concluding that there was no actual conflict of interest, the court pointed
to the MAR court's findings that Gillespie's prior representation of Wilson was
unrelated to Wilson's pending charges, Gillespie's representation of Wilson
ceased prior to the start of Chandler's trial, Gillespie could not recall the details
of Wilson's case or confidential information regarding Wilson, and no evidence
61. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 839.
62. Id
63. Id Gillespie maintained that he did not remember the specifics of his prior representa-
tion of Wilson or any confidential information obtained during his representation of Wilson. Id
Also, Gillespie did not cross-examine Wilson because he thought his co-counsel was better at
conducting cross-examination. Id.
64. Id at 840.
65. Id (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,348 (1980)); see also Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668,688 (1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
includes counsel with no conflicts of interest).
66. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 840 (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002)).
67. Id at 840 n.12; see Cuyler, 466 U.S. at 349-50 (stating, in a case involving simultaneous
representation, that if a defendant establishes an actual conflict of interest, the defendant does not
need to establish prejudice).
68. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 840.
69. Id (citing Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775,798 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Agosto,
675 F.2d 965,971 (8th Cir. 1982)).
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showed that Gillespie planned to represent Wilson in the future.7° Also, the
court stated that, even if there was an actual conflict of interest, no prejudice
resulted because the conflict did not affect Gillespie's performance.7 The court
found that the cross-examination of Wilson, conducted by Gillespie's co-counsel,
was thorough and included questions on Wilson's prior convictions, history of
drug abuse, and motivations for testifying against Chandler.7 2 Thus, the court
adopted the federal magistrate judge's conclusion that Chandler did not prove
any failings by his counsel and that no evidence connected the alleged failings
with Gillespie's potential conflict of interest.73
E. Trial Court's Failure to Instruct on Mitigating Circumstances
Finally, Chandler claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury on the mitigating circumstance that "[t]he capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional distur-
bance."74 The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that, inter a/ia, evidence of
Chandler's drinking on the night of the murder, his history of drug abuse, and his
mixed-personality disorder did not entitle him to that instruction.7 5 Chandler
claimed that the trial court's failure to give the instruction violated his "constitu-
tional rights by limiting the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence."
' 6
The Fourth Circuit agreed that a trial court cannot preclude the jury from
considering personal characteristics or circumstances surrounding the offense
that provide reasons for sentencing the defendant to life instead of death.77
However, the Fourth Circuit noted that "the Constitution does not dictate the
manner in which a jury considers and gives effect to mitigating evidence." 8 The
court found that "the instructions given by the trial court.., provided at least
three avenues" for the jury to consider the effects of Chandler's drinking, drug
70. Id at 841.
71. Id
72. Id.
73. Id; see Chandler, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 248-50 (rejecting Chandler's assertions that his trial
counsel's adverse performance resulted in prejudice to Chandler).
74. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 841 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(0(2) (2001)). See
general4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (2003) (stating that in cases in which "the death penalty
may be authorized, the judge shall include in his instructions to the jury that it must consider any
... mitigating circumstance... which may be supported by the evidence, and shall furnish to the
jury a written list of issues relating to such ... mitigating circumstance").
75. See Chandler, 467 S.E.2d at 636, 644-45 (stating that Chandler did not support his claim
by substantial evidence that he was under severe emotional disturbance at the time of the murder).
76. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 841.
77. Id at 842 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
78. Id. (citing Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998)).
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abuse, and personality disorder.79 Because the jury heard the mitigation evidence
and could consider the evidence through various avenues, the Fourth Circuit held
that the trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction did not violate
Chandler's constitutional rights.'
IV. Application in Virginia
A. Brady Issues
In evaluating the alleged Brady violations, the Fourth Circuit correctly
identified, but failed to apply, Kyles v. Whitlefias the standard for determining
whether the prosecution violated a defendant's due process rights by withholding
Brady material.82 The court stated that it must evaluate the cumulative effect of
the undisclosed Brady material in order to determine whether a new trial is
warranted.83 The court then evaluated the materiality of each individual violation
but did not evaluate the Brady violations cumulatively."4 For instance, the Fourth
Circuit found that the prosecution's failure to disclose the "What's in it for me?"
statement was immaterial because there was no deal between Wilson and the
prosecution and Chandler's attorney thoroughly cross-examined Wilson.8'
However, the court did not consider the statement's impeachment value in light
of the other undisclosed evidence undermining Wilson's credibility."" In his
petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Chandler
emphasized the importance of the evidence undermining Wilson's credibility
because Wilson's testimony was the primary factor elevating the crime to a capital
murder.8 7 Had the court evaluated the cumulative effect of the undisclosed
79. Id. at 841-42. The three avenues by which the jury could consider the mitigating
evidence were the following. (1) Chandler's ability" 'to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired' "; (2) a nonstatutory
mitigating circumstance that Chandler's poor choices in life resulted from his prior substance abuse;
(3) and the catch-all mitigating circumstance under N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 15A-2000(f)(9). Chandler,
89 Fed. Appx. at 842 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(0(6) (2001)); see N.C. GEN. STAT.
15A-2000() (listing the mitigating circumstances that a jury may consider).
80. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 842.
81. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
82. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 836 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34).
83. Id. (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436).
84. See id at 836-39 ("[We examine each of the items of evidence that Chandler claims
should have been disclosed to him."); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23-36, Chandler (No.
04-5904) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit cited the correct test but failed to apply it).
85. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 837.
86. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24, Chandler (No. 04-5904) ("mhe Fourth Circuit
in this case failed to engage in a 'cumulative effect' analysis required by this Court in its opinion in
Kyles.").
87. See id. at 9 ("Mr. Wilson[s testimony] transformed this case into a death penalty case
when it should have been a felony murder case resulting in a life sentence.").
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evidence, it is at least arguable that it would have had to acknowledge a reason-
able probability that the jurors would have sentenced Wilson to life."8
The Fourth Circuit also briefly mentioned that North Carolina Rule of
Evidence 608(b) may not allow the use of a handwriting expert's testimony "to
impeach a denial of authorship by" a witness.8" Although Virginia does not have
a statute similar to the North Carolina or Federal Rule of Evidence, the Supreme
Court of Virginia has held that evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness or bad
conduct are not admissible to undermine the credibility of a witness. 90 Yet,
Virginia allows parties to use prior inconsistent writings to impeach a witness's
testimony and has allowed handwriting experts to testify for the purposes of
authenticating documents.9 Thus, although it is not clear whether Virginia
courts will permit the use of a handwriting expert's testimony in order to under-
mine a witness's credibility, defense attorneys should be aware that federal courts
in the Fourth Circuit may not allow such testimony.
B. Conflict of Interests
Chandler also noted that an actual conflict of interest does not necessarily
exist when the defendant's attorney has previously represented a key prosecuto-
rial witness. 92 In order for a conflict of interest to violate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right, there must be" 'an actual conflict of interest [that] adversely
[affects the attorney's] performance.' """ The court listed four factors for courts
to consider in assessing whether there is an actual conflict of interest.94 How-
ever, the court stated that the presence of a conflict does not weigh entirely on
these factors.95 The important question is whether the counsel's obligations to
other clients compromised the representation of the current client.96 Thus, the
88. Id at 26, 29, 31-32.
89. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 839; see N.C. R. EVID. 608(b) ("Specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than convic-
tion of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.").
90. See Wynne v. Commonwealth, 218 S.E.2d 445, 446 (Va. 1975) (explaining that Virginia
courts allow evidence about general reputation for untruthfulness to impeach a witness but do not
allow the use of specific acts of untruthfulness or bad acts for impeachment).
91. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268.1 (Michie 2004) (allowing the cross-examination of a
witness regarding previous written statements); Wileman v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 621,
623-24 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (permitting the use of a handwriting expert to compare a defendant's
handwriting in a forgery case). See general CHARLEs E. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN
VIRGINIA § 15-10 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the use of expert testimony on handwriting for the
authentication of documents).
92. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 840-41.
93. Id at 840 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 840-41.
96. Id (citing Perillo, 205 F.3d at 798).
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court leaves a muddy picture of what constitutes an actual conflict of interest that
adversely affects a lawyer's performance. The primary factors in Chandler were
the time between representation, the information recalled by the attorney, and
the relation of the two defendants' charges.97 If any number of these factors
exist, a court may find that the conflict violated the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right.
C. Mitigating Circumstances
In instructing a jury on mitigating circumstances, a court does not violate
a defendant's due process rights as long as the judge permits the defense to
present certain mitigating evidence, and the court does not preclude the jury
from considering that evidence.9 8 Chandlerrelied on Buchanan v. Angelone,99 which
involved a challenge to a court's failure to instruct a jury to consider particular
mitigating evidence. 1"° In Buchanan, the only instruction to the jury that alluded
to mitigating evidence stated in part that "if you believe from all the evidence that
the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the Defen-
dant at life imprisonment..''. The Court in Buchanan found that the instruction
was sufficient because it allowed the jury to give effect to the mitigating evidence
presented and "did not foreclose the jury's consideration of any mitigating
evidence."' 0 2 Chandler and Buchanan are potentially damaging to capital defen-
dants because a general instruction such as the one given in Buchanan is vague and
gives juries little guidance on what mitigation evidence to consider.' Defense
attorneys should submit specific instructions in order to focus jurors' attentions
on specific mitigating circumstances.
V. Conclusion
Chandler held that courts do not need to instruct the jury in any specific way
regarding mitigating circumstances, as long as the jury hears the circumstances
and is not precluded from considering those circumstances." The Fourth
Circuit also set out the basic factors for assessing whether an attorney's prior
representation of a prosecution witness results in an actual conflict of interest
97. Id. at 841.
98. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 842.
99. 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
100. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275.
101. Id. at 272-73.
102. Id. at 277.
103. See id at 272-73 (stating that the only instruction drawing the jury's attention to mitigat-
ing evidence stated in part that "if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not
justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at life imprisonment").
104. Chandler, 89 Fed. Appx. at 842.
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that deprives the defendant of the right to counsel. 5 Finally, the court provided
some insight into how courts will review Bray and Napue claims under 28 U.S.c.
2254(d). °6
Justin B. Shane
105. Id at 840.
106. Id at 835-39.
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